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,QWURGXFWLRQ
There’s a commonly held view about the role and goals of experimental economics
that we think is greatly mistaken. According to such a view, the goal of laboratory
experimentation is to test economic theories (or models). This view is not restricted to
experimental economics, and therefore economists should not be particularly blamed
for it. It is part of a popular view of science, and as such informs the rhetoric of many
disciplines. Moreover, it has gained philosophical legitimacy by being systematised in
the so-called ‘Standard View’ that dominated philosophy of science for the best part
of the last century. Yet, as we shall argue, it is mistaken and exerts a bad influence on
experimental economics.
7KH7KHRU\7HVWLQJ9LHZ
It is widely believed that science is about finding the ‘best’ theories for the
explanation, and possibly prediction and control, of real-world phenomena. It is also
widely believed that experimental data play a crucial role in the selection of theories,
by eliminating weak candidates and corroborating promising ones. This view, if stated
in such vague terms, sounds roughly correct. But as soon as it is articulated and made
more precise, it turns out to be problematic. According to the WKHRU\WHVWLQJYLHZ of
science, as we shall call it, theorists propose, and experimenters control (and,
sometimes, dispose). This view has been systematised in the so-called ‘Standard-
View’ in the philosophy of science during the first half of the twentieth century.1
According to the Standard View theories are sets of sentences including at least one
candidate for a law of nature, i.e. a universal statement of unrestricted domain of
applicability, expressed in conditional form (‘For all entities x, if x has property P
then it also has property Q’). Candidate laws, along with ‘bridge laws’ connecting
them to phenomena and statements of initial conditions, are used to derive predictions
about particular events. After a prediction has been put forward, observed data can be
used to test the theory. The data ideally should provide one of two answers: if they are
consistent with the prediction (i.e. if the predicted phenomenon has been observed),
our confidence in the truth of the theory is increased. If in contrast the data are
inconsistent with the prediction, our confidence is diminished.
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1
 Cf. e.g. Popper (1934), Nagel (1961), and Hempel (1965).
2The standard view, to be sure, is entirely general and makes no principled distinction
between experimental and non-experimental tests. The practical difference is that in
the laboratory we can set up and control more tightly the initial conditions, and thus
make sure that the right conclusions can be drawn from the observed data. Imagine a
fictional astronomer trying to use Newton’s theory to predict the orbit of a planet. He
observes the position of the planets in the Solar system at time W1, and on the basis of
the laws of classical mechanics and a set of boundary assumptions derives a
prediction about the position of the planet at W2. But of course he may misidentify the
position of the planet, or of the Sun or some other planets (his telescope may be
faulty). Or some comet, black hole, or another unexpected entity may enter the scene,
mess up the initial conditions, and hence the prediction. When he finds out that the
planet is not where it was supposed to be at W2, the scientist will not be sure whether to
blame the theory or one of these unexpected interferences or changes in the initial
conditions of the system under observation.
This problem – known as the ‘Duhem-Quine problem’, from the physicist and the
philosopher who introduced it in the philosophical literature – is particularly critical in
the social sciences, where possible disturbing factors are numerous and ‘background’
circumstances tend to change frequently. The laboratory may reduce the practical
import of the problem quite drastically, by letting the scientist set up the initial
conditions, shield the system from external influences, and monitor it carefully so as
to avoid unexpected disturbances.2 Most experimental economists, we reckon,
embarked in this new programme precisely with the hope of finding a more effective
methodology than the traditional non-experimental approaches, and therefore
improving the empirical basis of economic science. Yet, these hopes must face some
challenging problems, which we discuss in the next section.
3UREOHPVZLWKWKHWKHRU\WHVWLQJYLHZH[WHUQDOYDOLGLW\DQGWKHYDJXHQHVVRI
HFRQRPLFPRGHOV¶DVVXPSWLRQV
Alongside with impressive confirmations of the predictions of some economic
models, experimental economics has also produced stunning refutations of  some
basic principles of economic theorising. This is to be expected from a genuinely
empirical discipline, but reactions to these findings have been varied and conflicting.
Some economists have welcomed the experimental anomalies as the ultimate proof
that the fundamental principles of mainstream economics are flawed and need drastic
revision. Others remain unconvinced and rebut by means of a simple but powerful
argument: economic models are supposed to be applicable to UHDO economies, not to
the ‘artificial’ conditions implemented in the economic lab. This critique raises a
problem that is well-known among experimental psychologists and other social
scientists, but is surprisingly little discussed in economics: the problem of H[WHUQDO
YDOLGLW\ of experimental results.3 The critics, in other words, claim that we should not
believe that experimental results can be transferred to ‘real-world’ economies.
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 The Duhem-Quine problem is logically-speaking unescapable, because we can never be sure that the
right controls have been implemented. But that’s life; what really matters is that there are practical
ways in science to reduce the problem’s impact.
3
 When it KDV been discussed, this problem has been referred to by experimental economists as the
problem of ‘parallelism’. Cf. e.g. Smith (1982), Wilde (1981).
3Experimental economists are annoyed by such remarks, especially when they are
unexplained (i.e. they don’t specify what the difference between laboratory and real-
world economies exactly amounts to), and are put forward by people who have no
deep understanding of laboratory practice. Yet, there is something in the above
critique, which points to a basic flaw in the theory-testing view and should be taken
seriously. The theory-testing view assumes that science is a game with two players
(see Figure 1). On the one hand, we have theory (which in economics takes the form
of sets of models), on the other reality. Theory is used to ask questions, the real world
answers these questions, and the theory is modified in order to take the answers into
account.
Models World
)LJXUH
But this view is too rough. In particular, it presupposes that HYHU\WKLQJthat takes place
on the right-hand side is relevant for the appraisal of economic models. This is just
what the critics of experimental economics deny: economic theory is aimed at
explaining (and help in predicting and controlling) only a certain SDUW of reality, and
what happens in economic labs does not necessarily (or primarily) fall into the
intended domain of application. There are two standard replies to this challenge,
which unfortunately are both unconvincing.
D(FRQRPLFWKHRULHVDUHJHQHUDOLQVFRSHRIDSSOLFDWLRQ This view has been
defended, among others, by Charles Plott (1991, p.905): “[economic] models are
general models involving basic principles intended to have applicability independent
of time and location”. Therefore, the argument goes, behaviour in laboratory settings
falls automatically within the domain of economic models, and whatever is observed
in there is relevant for the appraisal of economic theory. This view has a very
prestigious philosophical pedigree. It belongs, in fact, to the Standard View of
theories introduced in section 2 above. The Standard View, however, was put forward
with physics in mind, and in fact the requirement that theories should be general in
scope of application makes more sense in physics than in other scientific disciplines.4
As a matter of fact, most economic models describe mechanisms and phenomena
embedded in fairly specific institutional settings. It is pretty obvious, for example, that
the laws of supply and demand, or the mechanisms of market clearing, work only
when the ‘right’ conditions are in place5, but do not take place in, say, a centrally
planned economy. The argument does not fare better if we shift the focus to more
fundamental principles like the rationality assumptions of expected utility theory. It is
now commonly held that the sort of rational behaviour postulated in economic models
takes place only against the ‘right’ background conditions – in transparent settings
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 Although it is not uncontroversial even in the realm of physics: cf. Cartwright (1999).
5
 Part of the contribution of experimental economics, in fact, has been to identify some of the
conditions that make such phenomena and mechanisms possible.
4with learning and repetition, for instance (Plott 1995; Binmore 1999), but sometimes
fail in less than ideal environments.
One might reformulate the argument in normative form: perhaps economic models are
not general in scope and application, but they VKRXOG be. The generality requirement,
in other words, would be a desideratum, an ideal that guides the development of
science.6 The problem here is that there are good reasons to believe that the ideal
cannot be fulfilled in disciplines like economics. Unlike physics, which is concerned
with the discovery of the most basic properties of matter, sciences like economics (or,
for that matter, biology, psychology, and so on) investigate reality at a non-
fundamental level. It is highly likely that entirely general laws simply do not exist at
such level, because the entities and properties of economic science (preferences,
expectations, consumers, firms, markets) and the relations holding between them are
non-fundamental in character. Most ‘laws’ in the social sciences are FHWHULVSDULEXV in
character, and the ceteris paribus clause covers conditions and factors that go well
beyond the boundaries of economics. Of course one may try to overcome such
boundaries, to include all the factors and conditions that are sufficient for the
instantiation of economic effects; but then economics would become something very
different from what it is now, probably closer to psychology and neurophysiology. At
any rate, this sort of reduction is a long way off our present capacities, we need a
science of economic phenomena in the meantime, and to set unrealistic goals may do
more bad than good by taking economists’ attention away from what can be really
achieved.7
E(FRQRPLFH[SHULPHQWVVKRXOGPLUURUWKHDVVXPSWLRQVRIPRGHOV According to the
second argument experiments are devised to teach us about theory, and one should
not worry about the real world at all. If the theory is simple, the experiment must be
simple. If the theory is too simple to be applicable to reality, that is a theorist’s
problem rather than an experimental one (Smith, 1982, p. 268). This argument has the
rhetorical advantage of shifting the burden entirely on theoretical economists.8 But,
again, it does not work. An important implication of the argument outlined in the last
section is that it is unreasonable to assume that economic models can include a full
description of the conditions for their application. In other words, economic models
usually do not (and cannot) carry their domain of application written in their
assumptions.9 Models provide at best a partial indication of the sort of circumstances
in which they are supposed to work, and part of the skill of the applied scientist
consists precisely in the identification (and, sometimes, instantiation) of the implicit
conditions for their application.
This, by the way, is true across DOO science: experimental physicists are no less
obliged than economists to use their imagination and skill in order to create the right
conditions for the instantiation of a given model or the replication of a phenomenon.10
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 This position is strongly defended by the philosopher Karl Popper (1957).
7
 Notice, by the way, that the reduction of economics to neurophysiology or physics is not a very
attractive goal for a social scientist. For a more detailed defence of the argument in the main text see
Fodor (1974).
8
 Which, curiously, are sometimes very sceptical about experimental economics.
9
 This is one rationale behind Milton Friedman’s (1953) famous thesis on the inevitable
‘unrealisticness’ of the assumptions of economic models.
10
 Cf. for example Collins (1985) and Gooding (1990).
5The view according to which theory-testing is just a matter of following the
instructions of a theoretical model, a machine-like procedure guided by theory from
the beginning to the end, is just a myth. These considerations cast serious doubts on
the view that to shift the focus from real economies to theoretical models was the
greatest innovation of experimental economics. Plott (1991, p. 906) goes as far as to
say that an experiment “should be judged by the lessons it teaches about the theory
and not by its similarity with what nature might have happened to have created”. In
contrast, we think that to view scientific methodology as a play with just two
characters (abstract theoretical models and experiments) is highly misleading. In the
next section we sketch a view that takes the problem of external validity seriously,
and casts the role played by experiments and models in a different light.
([SHULPHQWVDVPHGLDWRUV
When we fund medical research, say, on the effects of a new drug, we expect
eventually to receive back some result that is relevant for us, human beings. We
would be disappointed if in the end we were provided with a detailed study on the
effects of a drug on mice, guinea pigs, monkeys, etc., but nothing at all on its efficacy
on the human form of that disease. The same applies to economics. It would be
embarrassing, we think, to admit that what experimental economists learn cannot be
extended outside the laboratory walls. Thus, eventually, scientific results need to
travel all the way to the ‘real world’. The picture of science we endorse is represented
in Figure 2 below.
Model Experiment Real World
)LJXUH
According to such a view, experiments are just an intermediate step in the route from
pure theory to real-world economic phenomena. They are ‘mediators’, in the sense
that they help bridging the gap between models and their intended domain of
application.11 The worse aspect of the theory-testing view is that it induces to think of
models (theory) and experiments (data) as two very different things, where in reality
they are not. Both models and experiments should be thought as V\VWHPV that we are
studying. Models can be abstract or, less frequently, concrete. Experimental systems
are obviously more concrete than models, and closer to the intended domain of
application because they include features that are held in common with the systems
we are eventually interested in understanding (the real-world economies). But they are
not the target system, and to move from experiment to target requires an inference.
Just like the model-to-experiment inference, the experiment-to-target inference is
inductive or ampliative (what we know about X does not allow us to derive
deductively the properties of Y), and hence fallible.
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 See also Guala (1998, 1999). The term ‘mediators’ has been borrowed from Morgan and Morrison
(eds. 1999). The thesis defended here is close to the so-called Semantic View of theories; cf. e.g. Giere
(1988). For a similar view of modelling in economics, cf. Sugden (2000).
6There is quite a lot of tacit and explicit knowledge about how to bridge the gap
between models and experiments -- or how to solve the problem of ‘LQWHUQDOYDOLGLW\’,
to follow the terminology of experimental psychology. At a fairly abstract level,
internal validity is achieved by repeatedly testing single causal hypotheses. If you
believe that effect Y may be due to factor X, you run an experiment where X is varied
and other possible factors are kept constant or eliminated altogether. The same can be
done for other factors, until possible interferences, background factors etc. have been
checked one by one.12 To put it sharply: H[SHULPHQWDOHFRQRPLFVLVIRUK\SRWKHVLV
WHVWLQJQRWWKHRU\WHVWLQJ The prima-facie appeal of the theory-testing view derives
from overlooking this basic distinction. An experimental hypothesis is usually
concerned with local circumstances, singular factors, very specific sources errors, and
may (but need not) be suggested by theory. Experimenters formulate hypotheses all
the time, about the incentives, the experimental design, the properties of the error
term. Theories explain by unifying, whereas experimental hypotheses do not.
Theories are supposed to be of general applicability, whereas experimental
hypotheses concern specific features of specific laboratory systems. Often they are
inspired by empirical data, or by intuition, and in any case the rejection of specific
hypotheses has no direct consequences regarding the acceptance of theoretical
models. That is not the main job experiments, as we have seen.
At a more concrete level, the task of establishing internal validity of an experimental
result depends on a lot of context-specific knowledge and techniques. Take any
textbook on experimental methods in economics (e.g. Friedman and Sunder 1994, or
Davis and Holt, 1993) or in the social sciences in general (e.g. Frankfurt-Nachmias
and Nachmias 1996) and you will find several pages on how to control preferences,
how to rule out undesired effects, and eventually how to infer from observed
statistical frequencies to causal relations between properties of the experimental
system. Of course much is left to intuition and the creativity of the experimenter, but
the basic strategies are well known. In contrast, we find very little explicit advice
about how to bridge the second gap, the one from experiment to reality (external
validity problem).
0LPLFNLQJWKHWDUJHW
There has been a lot of excitement recently about the applicability of game theory to
solve complicated problems of market regulation. The most famous application, the
auctions for third-generation mobile phone licences, were as a matter of fact a product
as much of game theory as of experimental economics. Since the story has already
been told elsewhere,13 we shall not repeat it here. For our present concerns we just
need to notice that the construction of the Federal Communication Commission
auctions is an instance of direct attack on the problem of external validity: in this case
the ‘real world’ itself (the market for portable communication systems) has been
shaped so as to fit the experimental prototypes in the lab. Again, there is nothing
peculiar here – this is just what happens with most technology, from space probes to
the TV sets in our homes.
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 See Mayo (1996) for a sophisticated analysis of experimental inference.
13
 Cf. Plott (1997), Guala (2001).
7But economists usually are not so lucky: they can rarely shape the world as they wish.
It is more common therefore to follow the opposite strategy. Instead of shaping the
world on the experiment, the experiment is changed so as to resemble the real world
in as many ‘relevant’ respects as possible. In order to do this, of course, we need to
know what sort of system we want to extend our results to. We need, in other words, a
specific WDUJHW. There are various examples of this strategy: to remain in the field of
auction theory, experimental research on the winner’s curse started precisely with the
aim of replicating a target phenomenon, allegedly observed in the auctions of the
Outer Continental Shelf.14 The advantage of this strategy is that it makes the external
validity problem tractable. If you observe phenomenon X in the laboratory, but you
are not sure about its robustness to real-world circumstances LQJHQHUDO, it is difficult
to tackle the problem constructively. You can do much more if you know exactly the
sort of circumstances you want to export your results to: in this case you can look for
VSHFLILFUHDVRQV why the result may not be exportable. These reasons will usually take
the form of some dissimilarity between the experimental and the target system. Thus,
the obvious way to proceed is to modify the experiment to include the feature of the
target that could be responsible for the external validity failure, and see whether it
does in fact make a difference or not. For example: if you think that real businessmen
are different from students, use businessmen in your experiments; if you think that an
ascending auction is different from a descending auction, use the former in your
experiment; and so on.
Notice that to add realistic details to an experiment implies increasing difficulties in
the interpretation of the experimental results. In this sense there is a clear trade-off
between internal and external validity: the simpler the experimental environment, the
easier it is to identify the cause(s) responsible for a given phenomenon or effect. This
is why experimenters like sober designs, where the subjects are engaged with very
abstract tasks. This is also why, we think, experimenters like to replicate quite literally
the idealised assumptions of theoretical models: because it is one way of achieving
simplicity of design.
Unfortunately the real world usually isn’t sober. By ‘taking away’15 complications we
also move away from the target. Choosing ‘to go abstract’ rather than ‘concrete’,
therefore, has unpleasant implications in any case, if we remain focused on a VLQJOH
experiment. But the negative consequences  of this trade-off can be partly neutralised
by performing a series of experiments. Notice that internal validity is logically and
epistemically prior: it doesn’t make much sense to ask whether an experimental result
can be exported to a given target system, if you are not even sure what you result is.
Thus, it is quite common to try first to achieve an understanding of a phenomenon (or
entity, institution, etc.) in a fairly abstract, ‘bare-bone’ version. Then, the experiment
is progressively ‘concretised’ in order to become more and more similar to the target
of interest. This is, by the way, what happens in biomedical science: in order to test a
new drug experimenters start with animal models,16 move on to human beings in
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 Cf. Kagel and Levin (1986) and Guala (1998).
15
 This is the etymological sense of the term ‘abstraction’: to take away, from the Latin DEWUDKHUH.
16
 We are simplifying drastically here: to find out which animals are ‘right’ for which kind of
investigation is not a trivial matter. Notice that animals are used for ethical reasons, not only for the
dangers involved, but also for the possibility of controlling, manipulating and simplifying the
environment they live in (temperature, diet, social relations, etc.). On animal models in biomedical
science, see LaFollette and Shanks (1995) and Ankeny (2001).
8‘ideal’ experimental settings, and conclude with so-called efficacy trials with patients
in more realistic conditions.
7KHGLVFRYHU\RIQHZSKHQRPHQD
So far, so good. But the auction case is fairly special. Although there are features of
real-life auctions that cannot be mimicked in the laboratory (think for instance at the
huge sums of money spent in the markets for mobile phone licences), the
experimenter can surely go a long way towards replicating features of the target
system. In most other cases of experimentation this can be done to a much lesser
extent. Still, we feel that even in such cases we have the possibility of learning
something of wider applicability than a mere laboratory game. But what H[DFWO\ can
we learn? Let us examine a concrete example.
One of us faced this question while working on a series of experiments on tax
evasion.17 Tax evasion is a particularly tricky area of investigation, because it is
commonly believed that experimental subjects tend to engage in behaviour that has
little to do with the target phenomenon.18 There are problems of scale, once again (the
sums involved are small compared to real tax payments), but also of game-like
behaviour (subjects tend to play with the experiment, rather than take it seriously), of
absence of social incentives (your family and friends don’t know, and don’t care, if
you are busted by the experimental taxman), of general unrealisticness (no lawyers,
no accountants), and many others. However, from a theory-testing perspective it is not
clear that these should all count as flaws of the experiment. Standard microeconomic
theory models tax evasion basically as a lottery, where the agent has a given
probability of being audited and therefore fined, and the utility varies only over
money (the utility of keeping income instead of paying the tax, and the disutility of
paying the fine). Social blame, shame, etc. do not enter the picture, nor do other social
norms and institutions. But as we have already argued, the theory-testing view is
wrong, and this case just provides more evidence that it is.
In the experiment ran at CEEL subjects were provided with a set of parameters
(income, the amount of tax to be paid, the probability of being audited) and were
asked to decide how much tax to pay effectively in each round. The experiment was
concerned with dynamic choice, and thus was extended over a series of 60 rounds.
The experiment was originally intended to test the effect of tax yield redistribution:
when the yield is redistributed, the tax experiment becomes a sort of public goods
experiment, with evasion basically analogous to free riding. Given that (contrary to
standard theory) cooperative behaviour has been extensively observed in public goods
experiments, by analogy the redistribution of yield may have the effect of reducing
the rate of evasion behaviour. In fact this conjecture was confirmed by the data.19
This result, however, is just the beginning of the story: as we said, theory-testing is
not the main nor the most easily attainable goal of experimental economics. A most
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 The experiments discussed in this part of the paper are described in more detail in Mittone (2002).
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 Cf. for instance Webley et al. (1991, pp. 39-47).
19
 Also other aspects of subjects’ behaviour cannot be explained by means of standard economic
theory, unless some very peculiar assumptions are made concerning risk-attitude. For example, the
highly erratic path of tax payments is compatible either with quickly changing attitudes towards risk, or
with risk neutrality and random behaviour. Cf. Mittone (2002) for more details.
9valuable feature of laboratory experimentation, one that makes it almost unique in the
field of social science, is that it sometimes leads to WKHGLVFRYHU\RIQHZXQH[SHFWHG
SKHQRPHQD. Moreover, unlike field observation, laboratory work usually allows the
demonstration that (1) the phenomenon in question is real and not just a spurious
regularity or an artefact of statistical analysis; (2) that it is robust to changes in
background factors.
A number of phenomena discovered in the lab have passed tests (1) and (2), and are
now widely discussed in the economic literature: take violations of rationality such as
the Allais paradox or preference reversals, but also the efficiency properties of double
oral auctions, the decay of contribution in public goods experiments, and so on. Here
we shall discuss just two phenomena that emerged from the tax experiments: we shall
call them the ‘bomb crater’ and the ‘echo’ effect.
%RPEFUDWHUVDQGHFKR
They say that troops under heavy enemy fire hide in the craters of recent explosions,
because they believe it highly unlikely for two bombs to fall exactly in the same spot
at short time-distance. Something similar seems to happen in the tax experiments:
immediately after each audit, tax payments fall sharply (i.e. evasion increases). The
‘bomb crater’ effect is represented in Figure 3.
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)LJXUH
When a phenomenon is observed for the first time, one wants to know how robust it is
to changes in experimental conditions. The bomb crater effect turns out to be
remarkably robust: it persists under changes in the methods used to inform subjects of
10
the probability of being investigated, under changes in the fiscal audit system, and is
not influenced by the tax yield redistribution. Moreover, it seems to crop up in a
number of other situations that have nothing to do with taxes and audits. Figure 4
represents a game invented by Luigi Mittone and tried repeatedly in the experimental
lab at the University of Trento. Two players move sequentially one of three concentric
wheels. The wheels can be moved only counter-clockwise, 90 degrees at a time.
Player A’s payoffs are given by the sum of the figures which end up in the north-
western quadrant, whereas Player B receives the payoffs in the north-eastern
quadrant. The game is essentially a coordination game, which can be used to
investigate the computational capacities of experimental subjects (how many rounds
can they anticipate, in reasoning about the game?) and their ability to communicate
with the other player the existence and willingness to follow a given strategy.20
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)LJXUH7KHµZKHHORIQXPEHUV¶
Now, it is possible to use this completely abstract, decontextualised game to observe
the bomb crater effect in action. In order to do that, it is sufficient to add a random
device, selecting every now and then one of the three wheels. If the selected wheel
has just been moved by a player, that player gets a payoff of zero. Laboratory data
show that the mere presence of a random device of this sort induces players to make a
number of irrational moves that are normally avoided in this game. Many players tend
to move the wheel that has just been selected by the random mechanism, consistently
with the ‘bomb-crater fallacy’, even though that move is clearly dominated by an
alternative one. Table 1 reports the results of this experiment.
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 It is possible to prove the existence of several Nash equilibria in this game, but given the focus of
this paper and the complex structure of the game we shall bracket such theoretical matters here.
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Group No. of rounds: chosen wheel
= selected wheel
No. of rounds: chosen wheel
= selected wheel, even
though dominated
Percentage of rounds: chosen
wheel = selected wheel, even
though dominated
1 19 out of 49 6 out of 19 35.5
2 17 out of 49 7 out of 17 41.1
3 18 out of 49 8 out of 18 44.4
4 17 out of 49 6 out of 17 35.2
5 18 out of 49 9 out of 18 50.0
7DEOH7KHZKHHORIQXPEHUV
The relevant data are in the two columns on the right-hand side: between 35 and 50%
of the times, the random device ‘attracted’ a player towards a dominated move. What
does this tell us about the generality of the bomb crater effect? The most plausible
answer is that we are dealing with a fairly common bias, which tends to arise
whenever subjects have to do with probabilistic reasoning of this kind.21 To establish
robustness is to establish a sort of generality, to a set of situations that are similar to
the ones in which the phenomenon has been observed. Robustness invites ‘generic’
confidence, in the sense that it is no evidence that the phenomenon will occur in DOO
circumstances, and provide no precise indication of the situations in which it will
occur and those in which it will not. Stylised facts from the real world invite caution:
there are reasons to believe, for instance, that erratic behaviour such as the one
observed in the tax experiments (a variance exacerbated by the crater effect) may not
arise in real-world circumstances. Some governments take erratic tax payments as
indicators of possible evasion, and therefore check erratic tax payers more often than
the others. This strategy (if known to tax payers, which is an empirical hypothesis)
may be enough to discourage the bomb crater effect.
The ‘echo’ effect is perhaps more promising from an external validity viewpoint.
After an audit, for some subjects and under certain circumstances, evasion remains
high for a few rounds – as if the falling of the bomb produced reverberations. This
prompts the consideration that the opposite may also be true: if we managed to induce
more law-abiding behaviour, the effect might be relatively enduring. If audits had
long-lasting psychological effects, then, such resilience could be exploited for policy
purposes. In order to check this hypothesis Mittone (2002) ran two separate sessions,
in which audits were confined to either the early (Figure 4) or the late rounds (Figure
5) respectively. Repeated auditing seems to have quite a strong effect in inhibiting
evasion, when it takes place in the first half of the experiment. In contrast, if subjects
experience a long period of unpunished evasion at the beginning of the experiment,
even a series of audits do not manage to raise the average level of tax payment.
Subjects seem to become more risk-takers, and apparently it takes time for them to
revise their attitude. Again, this sort of attitude is robust to changes in design
conditions. Moreover, we can think of several examples from real life which seem to
support the generalisability of the ‘punishment’ effect. In Italy, for example, where
police officers are well known for their inconsistent attitude towards fining, car
drivers seem to proceed at lower speed on roads upon which the police have
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 This bias is related (perhaps a special case) of the so-called ‘gambler’s fallacy’, i.e. the tendency to
over or underestimate probabilities based on a limited sample of events. This sort of fallacy has been
elicited by psychologists in experiments on animals and human subjects since the 1930’s (cf. Brunsvik
1939; Brunsvik and Herma 1951; Jarvik 1951).
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consistently focused across a short period of time. Something like this might happen
with tax audits: repeatedly auditing an individual or group of people may cause a
robust reduction of evasion for quite a long time after the event.
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([SHULPHQWDOUHVLGXDOV
The echo effect is probably a VWURQJ phenomenon, which promises to be applicable to
a wide range of non-experimental circumstances. Why exactly are we inclined to say
so? Part of the answer lies in its unexpected character. The bomb crater and the echo
phenomena were noticed ‘post hoc’, while analysing data collected to test a different
phenomenon (the effect of tax yield redistribution). This fact, quite paradoxically,
improves rather than affects for the worse its credentials as a non-purely experimental
phenomenon. The underlying reasoning goes as follows: an experiment is usually
designed to test the effect of a series of factors or independent variables (;1, ;2, …,
;Q)22 on a dependent variable (<). Usually, the experimenter tries to design an
experiment such that no other factor besides ;1,…,;Q is likely to have an influence on
<. (This is why, as we have already noticed, abstract designs facilitate
experimentation.) Then, one factor (say, ;1) is varied while the others are kept
constant, and the procedure is iterated for the other ;2,…,;Q.
The list of potentially relevant ;L may come from theory, from previous experimental
results, or just from common sense. In the original tax experiment described above,
the main variable at stake was tax yield redistribution, which in theory should make
no difference but in practice (given the evidence from public goods experiments) is
likely to have some. The idea of having redistribution can also be seen as an attempt
to ‘import’ into the experiment some real-world features and thus increase the
                                                
22
 Of course in some cases these may be a singleton, when we focus on just one factor.
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external validity of the experiment (along the lines sketched in section 5 above). But
this attempt is convincing only up to a point: the experimental redistribution can only
DSH (‘mimic’ would be too much here) the redistribution of tax yields in the real
world. Who gets what of the redistributed money in the experiment is totally
transparent, for example, whereas tax money affects our lives in many indirect and
hardly quantifiable ways. The trade-off between evading and paying taxes is easily
computable in the experiment. The money is distributed to a small number of people,
among which there probably at least a couple of friends, and so on. Importing features
of the target here does not carry us a long way towards external validity because we
NQRZ that the main dependent variable has been constructed ‘artificially’, and we are
aware of its limitations with respect to the real thing.
The unexpected effect, in contrast, seems more promising. The idea is that LI ;1,…,;Q
are UHDOO\ the only variables that were artificially constructed by the experimenter,
then the unexpected, residual effect is likely to be the consequence of some non-
purely-experimental factor. An analogy here may help: cosmic microwave radiation
was first observed in 1964 by Penzias and Wilson, two scientists at Bell Labs, while
working on a problem of telecommunication technology. Perhaps the echo effect is
like the isotropic radio background detected by Penzias and Wilson. The radiation is a
left-over from the Big-Bang and fills the space everywhere in the universe.
Regardless of where you are, it is there, although its properties may be in some
circumstances be difficult to detect due to other disturbing factors and local
circumstances. Such phenomena often emerge as residuals that cannot be imputed to
the experimental procedures or other known factors, and prove to be extremely robust
to measurement and experimental manipulation.
The analogy with the echo effect should be clear: first you observe something that you
don’t think has been created by the experimental procedures; then, by checking the
robustness of the phenomenon to changes in other variables, you become more
confident that the phenomenon is indeed a general feature of human psychology. The
checking is important because the whole inference rests on a crucial background
assumption: that no other ‘artificial’ factor besides ;1,…,;Q has been inadvertently
built into the experiment. This assumption is credible if the experiment has been
designed with enough care, and in part depends on the experience of the experimenter
and her detailed knowledge of her system. But no matter how much experienced,
some checking is necessary, and the scientific community will not be convinced until
most attempts to ‘make the effect go away’ have failed.23
The generalisability of the echo effect to VSHFLILFcases, nevertheless, remains an
empirical conjecture, which has to be further validated by empirical investigation
case-by-case. The experimental economist, in a case like this, proves the existence of
a phenomenon, which is likely to be relevant to the policy-maker. The experimenter
cannot guarantee that the phenomenon will be actually relevant in a specific case
because the effect may be neutralised by some context-specific factor, but can signal a
possibility. The actual effectiveness of the policy (repeated auditing, in this specific
case) will depend on a number of features of the specific economic system at stake
(the target system, in the terminology used in this paper).
                                                
23
 See also Galison (1987) for a similar form of reasoning in physics. Another intuitive analogy can be
drawn with the way in which econometricians detect the existence of factors not explicitly modelled in
the regression equations.
15
7KHOLEUDU\RISKHQRPHQD
The examples we have described above are representative of a number of experiments
(the majority, perhaps) performed in economics. In some happy cases the
experimenter can go all the way from the model on the far left to the target system on
the right of Figure 2. But these cases are quite rare. Most cases of experimentation
involve inferences to generic circumstances rather than to specific situations. This is
because the target is left unspecified, or cannot be studied properly for lack of data.
Experimental Economics nevertheless helps the applied scientist by providing a
‘OLEUDU\RISKHQRPHQD’: a list of possible effects, biases, heuristics which can then be
used in concrete applications. Each application then is a matter of examining the
specific characteristics of the target domain, and based on this specific knowledge,
evaluate the relevance of the phenomena found in the library, case by case.
This way of framing the problem recovers a basic distinction, between ‘pure’ and
‘applied’ science, while defending experimental economists from the charge of
pursuing futile research. Although a research programme must eventually end in
application, this need not be so for a single experiment. A single experiment may just
highlight a phenomenon or cause-effect link, to be later exploited by applied scientists
when they deal with specific cases. In any case, to export a phenomenon requires very
detailed knowledge of the domain of application. Since the required knowledge is
context-specific and probably generalisable only up to a point, it is reasonable to have
a division of labour between applied scientist and experimenter.
Unlike some of its neighbour disciplines, like experimental psychology, that are
widely used to resolve concrete problems (in the real world), the art of applying
experimental economics is still underdeveloped.24 Unlike psychologists, experimental
economists grew within (and had to defend themselves from) a scientific paradigm
that gives enormous importance to theory. This is probably why it was easiest and
most effective from a rhetorical viewpoint to present experimental economics as
primarily devoted to theory-testing. We have tried to show that this view is mistaken,
and that the role of experimental economics is to mediate between abstract theory and
problem-solving in the real world. In many respects experiments resemble models, for
they are systems that are artificially isolated from the noise of the real world – but
with the added bonus of a higher degree of concreteness. Like models, experimental
results must eventually be applicable to real-world circumstances. As we have tried to
show, the relevance of results may be indirect, and it is unreasonable to impose the
requirement that the experimental validity of each single experiment be proven
rigorously. In many cases, experimenters contribute to the ‘library’ of phenomena that
the applied scientist will borrow and exploit opportunistically on a case-by-case basis.
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